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The DSM-5 as Political Battleground: 
Gender Identities, Sexual Norms, and Female Desire 
 
Robbie Duschinsky & Véronique Mottier 
 
 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is the standard 
reference for the classification of mental disorders, and is seen as authoritative 
by clinicians, academics, drug companies and policy makers alike around the 
world. As the first major revision since 1994, the publication of the 5th edition of 
the DSM in May 2013 represented a significant and global event. The terms 
published in DSM-5 in 2013 will become terms through which individuals and 
groups know themselves, claim rights, and are offered support, insurance and 
psychological and pharmaceutical intervention. In the UK,  the World Health 
Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) is more 
commonly used for assessing mental health. The DSM has nonetheless been 
particularly influential in the classification of disorders relating to sexuality and 
gender, also in the UK. The new edition is likely to influence worldwide research 
culture and medical practice around gender and sexuality directly, but also to 
have a profound indirect influence on medical practice through its impact on 
culture, law and identity politics.  The publication of DSM-5 consequently 
provides an important incentive to debate the role of psychiatric labels in 
constructing the context within which we find and shape  our identities and 
practices, a process which is both so pervasive and so individualised that it may 
otherwise often be able to pass without comment or critique at a more general 
level. 
Psychiatric discourses have increasingly struggled with their 
embeddedness in culture and identity politics since the partial declassification of 
homosexuality from the DSM in the 1970s. This struggle for negotiating the 
meanings available for designating sexual and gender identities and norms  has 
been especially salient for the DSM-5 Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders Work 
Group. For example, the changes to diagnostic categories suggested by this Work 
Group have received particular criticism from the National Institute for Mental 
Health in the USA (Insel 2013) and the British Psychological Society (2011). The 
former have criticised the DSM-5, and the sexual and gender identity disorders in 
particular, as unscientific, without sufficient grounding in objective laboratory 
testing. The British Psychological Association, by contrast, have levelled 
criticisms at the same diagnostic categories for neglecting relationships and 
social factors in the mistaken assumption that this will help, rather than hinder, 
the achievement of scientific neutrality. Another example of a particularly 
intense current battleground is that formed by the DSM-5 classifications of sexual 
desire and female sexuality more specifically, which have triggered critical 
scrutiny from feminist scholars.  
This special issue brings together researchers who have led revisions to 
DSM-5 as part of the Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders Work Group – Ken 
Zucker and Cynthia Graham – with social scientists interested in and critical of 
their work – Monica Greco and Alyson Spurgas. It emerges from discussions 
about the politics of psychological science that took place at the Classifying Sex: 
Debating DSM-5 conference at the Cambridge Centre for Research in the Arts, 
Social Sciences and Humanities (CRASSH), Cambridge University 4-5 July 2013, 
organised by ourselves, and sponsored by the Wellcome Trust, CRASSH, the 
French Institute, the Gender Identity Research and Education Society, and the 
British Sociological Association Sexual Divisions Study Group. From quite 
different epistemological, methodological and political perspectives, the papers 
in this special issue analyse how psychiatric labels of sexuality, gender and desire 
navigate wider cultural discourses about sexual norms.  
 The special issue begins with Monica Greco’s “What is the DSM?”, which 
situates controversies around psychiatric classifications of sexuality and gender 
within the broader history of the DSM. This article is unusual and valuable in 
offering both an introduction to the DSM accessible to a non-specialist, and a 
deep and acute interrogation of the role and influence of the document to date, 
and thereby an important contribution to the specialist literature (see also Paris 
and Philips 2013). Greco undertakes a close consideration of changes in the 
knowledge practices the DSM formulates and enacts. She traces the roots of this 
ecology to the role, since DSM-III, of an unreflective commitment to an ontology 
that privileges the brain and biology and which, hence, considers itself 
atheoretical and politically neutral in distinguishing the normal from the 
pathological in formulating diagnostic categories. In conceptualising the specific 
significance of the publication of DSM-5 within this ecology of knowledge 
practices, Greco focuses on three keywords – polyvalence, ambivalence and 
participation – which help explain  the manual’s continuing prominence. First, as 
Greco emphasises, the DSM is a powerful object because it is a ‘polyvalent’ object: 
the key to its success lies in its ability to serve multiple functions for multiple, but 
related, interests – ranging from psychiatry as a profession, through to academic 
researchers, patient groups, and  pharmaceutical companies. She gives the 
example of the failure of attempts to revise DSM from a categorical to a 
dimensional model of pathology to show that the document serves multiple 
social functions and supports embedded institutional frameworks, which  makes 
it difficult to enact structural rather than incremental change to how it classifies. 
 However, Greco issues a strong warning to those commentators on the 
DSM who overstate the importance of formal classifications at the expense of 
paying attention to how the manual is used in practice, including the 
workarounds which get used and the opportunities made available to other 
stakeholders. She terms this dimension the ‘ambivalence’ of the DSM: the street-
level power of the psychiatrist includes many ways in practice to work around 
the constraints imposed by the language and divisions of the DSM; likewise, 
different strategies also become available for policy-makers to audit and police 
the actions of clinicians, and for patients to present themselves and make use of 
the DSM in gaining access to services. Greco also makes a strong call for attention 
to the way wider cultural discourses of transparency, inclusiveness, 
collaboration, accountability and respect for diversity have been refracted 
through the process of the construction of the DSM-5. She notes that while the 
idea of including patients and families in the revision process was dismissed by 
leading psychiatrists, one of the innovations associated with DSM-5 was the 
creation of a website through which members of the public could see some of the 
developments proposed by the DSM-5 Working Groups and contribute 
comments, questions and concerns. An expressed goal of this platform was to 
contribute to transparency. However, Greco points out, it was not clear at all how 
input from public consultations was considered, or whether any was 
implemented She suggests that there are indications of a process of spiralling 
distrust between the American Psychiatric Association and its patient 
stakeholders in the area of mental health. 
 The next article is an interview with Ken Zucker, who was the Chair of the 
DSM-5 Work Group on Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders. In this interview, 
Robbie Duschinsky questions Zucker about dilemmas encountered by the Sexual 
and Gender Identity Disorders Work Group.  Zucker’s account raises clearly the 
issues of polyvalence, ambivalence and relative participation from the public 
which Greco suggests have been so important for the DSM-5 in general. His 
willingness to describe the process by which the Work Group operated, and the 
dilemmas the Group faced also illustrates Greco’s emphasis on the significance of 
transparency for the DSM-5 over its predecessors. The interview discusses 
controversies that were faced by the three sub-Work Groups (Gender Identity 
Disorder; Sexual Dysfunctions; and Paraphilias), coming both from debates about 
scientific evidence, and from the needs and expectations of different 
stakeholders. For instance, he illustrates both sets of concerns by giving an 
account of the proposal by one member of the paraphilias sub-Work Group, 
Martin Kafka, for a new ‘Hypersexual Disorder’ category within the sexual 
dysfunctions. In the event, this new category was not included in the DSM, but 
proposed for inclusion in an appendix for further study (but later rejected). 
Zucker also discusses the role of the Board of Trustees in rejecting the diagnostic 
criteria for paedophilia to include hebephilia (primary sexual preference for 
early adolescents), which had been proposed by the Work Group. He states that 
‘the decision to reject the proposal was certainly not based on scientific grounds 
but with regard to some other issues, political or otherwise.’ 
 Zucker is pressed by Duschinsky on how the Work Group managed 
tensions between scientific and social concerns, for instance in relation to the 
potential use of the diagnostic categories within the paraphilias within forensic 
contexts. He is also asked to account further for the changes which accompanied 
the change in nomenclature from Gender Identity Disorder to Gender Dysphoria 
with the DSM-5. Zucker is Head of the Gender Identity Service for children and 
adolescents at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health in Toronto, and played 
an integral role in this change. He acknowledges that ‘the sexual dysfunctions and 
Gender Dysphoria certainly push the margins of what are considered mental 
disorders.’ However, he highlights the importance of individualising discourses 
regarding distress and impairment in shaping perceptions of Gender Dysphoria 
and the sexual dysfunctions as mental disorders by the relevant sub-Work Group. 
Whereas Jack Drescher on the Gender Identity Disorder sub-Work Group argued 
that trans people needed to be classified as having Gender Dysphoria in order to 
get access to medical treatment, Zucker argues that that was not the decisive 
consideration. He reports his own perception of Gender Dysphoria as a coherent 
set of signs and experiences which, clustered together, result in a kind of distress, 
which marks it out as distinct and discrete to some degree. This shaped his 
emphasis on the importance of suffering for conceptualising the purpose of 
classification and the boundaries of mental disorder. 
One of the areas of controversy discussed by Zucker was the proposal to 
merge Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder for women and Female Sexual Arousal 
Disorder into one overarching category, which is now called Sexual 
Interest/Arousal Disorder. He notes that people who self-identify as asexual 
were worried that the DSM-5 was going to pathologise them, but thinks that the 
emphasis on distress and impairment allows for an adequate, if not good, 
differentiation between a sexual orientation and a mental disorder. The third 
article, by Cynthia Graham, relates her experiences as part of the Sexual 
Dysfunctions sub-Work Group, and the rationales  for the changes they made to 
conceptualising women’s sexual desire and arousal in DSM-5. She recalls 
conversations in this sub-Work Group which led to overarching goals in the 
revisions they proposed for DSM-5. These included placing more emphasis on the 
subjective and relational aspects of women’s sexual experience and less on the 
genital aspects of sexual response, and giving greater acknowledgment of the 
variability in women’s sexuality. The sub-Work Group were also intent on 
avoiding pathologizing normal variation in women’s experiences of desire and 
arousal. 
Graham surveys some of the relevant research literature which informed 
the sub-Work Group’s discussions. For instance, she describes the significance of 
qualitative studies which had found that women often do not differentiate 
between sexual desire and arousal – and, when these are experienced as distinct 
from one another, they do not follow in a uniform sequence of phases. She also 
recalls the difficulties faced by the sub-Work Group in navigating definitional 
problems, which threatened to undermine their attempts to achieve their goals 
through eliding important differences between a mental disorder, a dysfunction, 
the experience of distress and the existence of variation between women. In line 
with their goals and with the available research evidence, Graham argues that in 
contrast to the limited, linear, mechanistic and biologistic classifications it 
replaced, the DSM-5’s new Female Sexual Interest/Arousal Disorder is a much 
broader diagnosis which includes behavioural, subjective and physical aspects of 
sexual experience. For instance, the new diagnostic category gained severity and 
duration criteria compared to its predecessors, in order to avoid pathologising 
mild and transient experiences of lack of sexual interest and/or arousal which 
are not unusual in the general population. DSM-5 now contains a requirement for 
the diagnosis of Female Sexual Interest/Arousal Disorder that the symptoms 
have persisted for a minimum duration of approximately six months, and have 
been experienced during almost all or all sexual encounters. The manual also 
includes the specification that: “if the sexual difficulties are the result of 
inadequate sexual stimulation…a diagnosis of sexual dysfunction would not be 
made.” (APA 2013, p. 423) A very important further addition in Graham’s eyes is 
that the manual now specifies that aspects of the patient’s relational and social 
contexts, such as partner factors or cultural/religious factors, should be assessed 
by clinicians before making a diagnosis of Female Sexual Interest/Arousal 
Disorder.  
Alyson Spurgas’s article, which closes the special issue, argues that the 
Sexual Dysfunctions sub-Work Group did not go far enough, however, in 
emphasising the relational and social context of lack of sexual interest and/or 
arousal in women. One aspect of Spurgas’ article is a critical commentary on the 
text of the DSM-5 Female Sexual Interest/Arousal Disorder. Spurgas points out 
that while present-day partner violence is now specified in the DSM-5 as a factor 
which should preclude a diagnosis of Female Sexual Interest/Arousal Disorder, 
past violence with a partner and relational distress below the level designated 
“severe” are not. Spurgas proposes that these absences epitomise a broader 
tendency in the formulation of the diagnostic category to carve lack of sexual 
interest and/or arousal out from the broader cultural context of quotidian 
misogyny, sexual coercion, and sexual norms in our culture which make a 
woman’s willingness to engage in sex a requirement for perceived normality. She 
also criticises the sub-Work Group for maintaining the term “sexual receptivity” 
within one of the six criteria for the category (a diagnosis requires meeting 
three), suggesting an image of female sexuality which has roots in a sexist 
association of men with activity and women with sexual passivity.  
Spurgas draws on interview research with 37 pre-menopausal women 
who have experienced low desire, noting her finding that nearly every one of 
these women had experienced sexual or gender trauma earlier in their life. She 
gives extracts from interviews with her participants who had been treated with 
Mindfulness-based Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for low sexual interest and/or 
arousal. Mindfulness-based Cognitive Behavioral Therapy is a therapeutic 
approach that incorporates the Buddhist technique of meditative mindfulness to 
help women stay ‘focused’ and ‘present’ during a sexual encounter, and not to get 
lost in associations with past sexual experiences. On the basis of these interviews, 
Spurgas criticises both the therapeutic approach and the diagnosis of low sexual 
interest and/or arousal for failing to give  adequate attention to the context of 
these symptoms. In particular, she emphasises that both Mindfulness-based 
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and Female Sexual Interest/Arousal Disorder in 
the DSM-5 miss something important: The symptoms of Female Sexual 
Interest/Arousal Disorder occur in the context of – and indeed, may be partially 
caused by – a sexist culture. As such, Female Sexual Interest/Arousal Disorder 
may have roots in the potentially violent relationship pressures on women to 
engage in penetrative intercourse, and the experience of a history of relational 
trauma and gender violence. 
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